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Abstract
In recent times, the functioning of various aspects of modern society—ranging
from the various infrastructural utilities such as electrical power, water to
socio-economical aspects such as telecommunications, business, commerce,
education—has become critically reliant on communication networks, and
particularly on the Internet. With the migration of critical facilities to the
Internet, it has become vitally important to ensure the reliability and avail-
ability of networks. In this paper, we study various modeling and analysis
techniques that can aid in the study of reliability of communication networks.
In this regard, we provide background on the modeling techniques (such as
reliability block diagrams, fault trees, Markov chains, etc.) and analysis
techniques (such as mathematical analytical methods, simulation methods,
and formal methods). Apart from providing the necessary background, we
also critically evaluate the pros and cons of different approaches, and provide
a detailed survey of their applications in communication networks. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth review of the application of
reliability modeling and analysis techniques in communication networks.
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1. Introduction
Communication networks have become an integral part of our daily life
with applications ranging from ubiquitous hand held devices (like cell phones
and remote car keys) to sophisticated equipment used in aircrafts, power sys-
tems, nuclear plants and healthcare devices. Given the safety and financial-
critical nature of many of these applications, the failures in the underlying
network elements can significantly affect the performance of network services
and have detrimental, or even catastrophic, results.
For instance, the virtualized environment of a virtual data center in a
cloud computing network is often subjected to transient latency, dropped
packets, and full-blown network partitions [1]. A study for the cloud comput-
ing vulnerabilities shows that there were about 172 unique cloud computing
outage incidents between 2008 and 2012 [2]. The major causes of these in-
cidents include (i) insecure interfaces and application programmer interfaces
(APIs), (ii) data loss and leakages, and (iii) hardware failures. The main vic-
tims of these vulnerabilities include Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Apple
and the vulnerabilities resulted in heavy financial losses [2]. It is reported
that the Amazon Web Service (AWS) suffered an unavailability for 12 hours,
in April 21, 2011, causing hundreds of high-profile Web sites to go offline [3],
which resulted in a loss of 66,240 US$ per minute downtime of its services. In
order to predict such problems beforehand, several reliability modeling and
analysis techniques are utilized [4].
Reliability is defined as the probability of a system or a sub-component
functioning correctly under certain conditions over a specified interval of
time [5]. For instance, the reliability of network nodes, termed as the ter-
minal reliability, is the probability that a set of operational edges provides
communication paths between every pair of nodes [6]. Another closely re-
lated concept with reliability is availability [7], which can be defined as the
probability that a component will be available when demanded [8]. As an ex-
ample, the availability of a mesh network is the probability that every mesh
node is connected to at least one gateway [9]. To understand the difference
between the reliability and availability concepts, it is important to realize
that reliability refers to failure-free operation during an interval, while avail-
ability refers to failure-free operation at a given instant of time [10, 11]. The
availability of a system is typically measured as a function of reliability and
maintainability, which is defined as the probability of performing a successful
repair action of a system under a given time and stated conditions [5]. Ad-
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Figure 1: (a) Taxonomy of Dependability Attributes (b) Steps for Reliability
Assessment
ditionally, if we keep the maintainability measure constant, the availability
of the system is directly proportional to the reliability of the system, i.e., an
increase in reliability increases the availability of the system and vice versa
[12]. Dependability [7], i.e., an umbrella concept that subsumes reliability
and availability considerations, is primarily defined as the ability of a system
to perform its desired function or tasks faultlessly in a certain environment
on a planned time period [13]. Many authors describe dependability of a
system as a set of properties or attributes such as reliability, maintainability,
safety, availability, confidentiality, and integrity [14, 8, 15]. Some of these
attributes, such as reliability and availability, are quantitative whereas some
are qualitative, for instance, safety [7]. A generalized view of dependability
attributes along with its threats and the means to achieve dependability are
shown in Figure 1. This paper is mainly focused on reliability and availability
because of its importance and wide utilization in the area of communication
networks.
Reliability analysis plays a vital role in the identification of existing prob-
lems in communication networks, prevention of future problems by improving
network design, prediction of the behavior of telecommunication networks
versus time and providing decision making support in designing performance
efficient telecommunication networks [16]. In particular, the reliability pre-
diction allow us to determine the redundancy requirements in the given net-
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work, the ability of a network to maintain an acceptable reliability level under
extreme environmental conditions and assess the impact of design changes
on the reliability of the overall network [17]. Similarly, the availability pre-
diction allows us to evaluate various maintenance design options to achieve
the desired availability of the network [18].
The qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis requires the selection
of an appropriate mathematical modeling and analysis technique. The mod-
eling technique must be able to effectively capture the important parameters
of the real system and the analysis technique should be capable of providing
insights into the system behavior without running (or executing) the real sys-
tem. There are numerous techniques that can provide analysis in the early
phase, when only initial details are available of the design, and there are other
techniques that cater the analysis of the later design phases, when more pre-
cise implementation details are available [16]. Some of the most widely used
formalisms/techniques for modeling reliability and availability of communi-
cation networks are: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [19], Fault Tree (FT)
[20], and Markov Chain (MC) [21]. Traditionally, the models developed using
these techniques are analyzed using analytical methods or simulation tools.
Recently, the computer networks community has shown great interest
in the utilization of formal methods [22] as a reliability analysis technique
for communication networks. Formal methods use mathematical logic to
precisely model the system’s intended behavior and deploy mathematical
reasoning to construct an irrefutable proof that the given system satisfies
its requirements. This kind of mathematical modeling and analysis makes
formal methods an accurate and rigorous analysis method compared to the
traditional analytical and simulation based analysis. This is because the in-
volvement of manual manipulation/simplification in paper-and-pencil based
analytical methods makes the analysis error-prone, especially while analyzing
large systems. In addition, the key assumptions for analytical proofs may be
implicit in the mind of the mathematician and not documented, which can
create problems when the system is designed and implemented.
An overview of the essential steps for conducting reliability assessment
of communication networks, is shown in Figure 1(b). The main steps are:
(i) Development a conceptual behavioral model of the given system; (ii)
Calculation of reliability and availability metrics; (iii) Selection of reliabil-
ity modeling techniques; and (iv) Selection of reliability analysis techniques.
The first step of the reliability assessment starts with the construction of the
conceptual behavioral model of the system. In this step, the network de-
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sign engineers describe the intended mode of communication and the desired
network behaviours, such as network protocols, network topologies and fault
tolerance, of the given communication network. The second step is the cal-
culation of basic metrics of reliability and availability, such as mean-time to
failure (MTTF) [23], mean-time between failure (MTBF) [24] and mean-time
to repair (MTTR) [23], at the individual component level of the communi-
cation network. The metrics of MTTF and MTBF are the basic metrics of
reliability, usually measured in the unit of hours for non-repairable and re-
pairable systems, respectively. For example, these metrics can be obtained
by statistically calculating the failure rates of the routers that are generally
modeled as the network nodes. Suppose 10 routers are tested for 500 hours
and 2 failures occur during this time. We can then estimate the failure rate of
the routers by using λ = number of failures
number of routers∗Total time = 0.004 failure/hour and
1
λ
= 2500 hours/failure. As mentioned earlier, the availability is estimated
by using the reliability and the maintainability metrics, i.e., the availability
of each network component is based on the MTBF and MTTR measures of
each network component [25]. So, the availability is calculated from reliability
and also incorporate repair. The typical formula for availability calculation
is MTTF
MTTR+MTTF
.
The details of the above-mentioned metrics, at the component level, are
essentially required by the reliability modeling techniques to estimate the
reliability at the system level. The next step is the selection of an appropriate
reliability modeling technique, such as RBD, FT or MC. In some cases, the
selection of modeling technique is a direct consequence of the decisions taken
in the first step. For instance, Markov chains could be the obvious choice
if the system is dynamic in nature, otherwise, RBD and FT are generally
the first choice of network design engineers due to their ability to model
complex network systems in a simple understandable way. However, it has
been observed from the literature that some network systems can be easily
modeled by more than one reliability modeling techniques. In this situation,
the network design engineers articulate their computational resources and
choose the reliability analysis technique accordingly, at the last step. For
instance, if the state-space modeling techniques are selected then analytical
techniques can be used if the given system is not too large. Simulation
techniques, on the other hand, are well suited for larger systems but for
safety-critical network systems, state-space base formal methods, like Perti
Nets and Model checking, are becoming a common choice of network design
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engineers.
To understand the above-mentioned reliability assessment steps, we con-
sider a network model, which is made up of 5 wireless nodes. Assuming that
as soon as 3 of these nodes are out-of-service then the communication gen-
erally degrades so much that the system can be considered as unavailable.
But, it may happen that the traffic is so low that a degraded level of trans-
mission can also become acceptable. The reliability analysis of this Wireless
sensor network (WSN) allows us to find quantitative information about its
availability. The first step is the development of a conceptual model of the
network behaviour and it usually requires a considerable amount of effort.
In the literature, the reliability analysis of similar kinds of WSN systems has
been studied in detail [26, 27]. The authors, in [27], defined reliability of a
WSN system as a probability that at least k sensor nodes are alive at time t.
Then they analyzed the reliability and availability of WSN systems by using
network topologies, such as star, tree and mesh, and derived the analyti-
cal relationships to determine the least number of nodes that are essentially
required for the network to be available. The second step, in the above ex-
ample, is to determine the MTTF and MTTR of the WSN nodes [26]. In the
third step, we can choose a modeling method, such as a Markov chain, for
the availability analysis of WSN [27]. The exponential distributions can be
used to model the failure characteristics of the WSN nodes. Lastly, the node
availability expressions of the WSNs can be analytically derived by using the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations in order to determine the producibility of
a WSN, which is the probability that at least k of the n nodes are able to
send data to the sink at time t [27]. Simulations can also be used to analyze
the behaviour of WSN producibility for different parameter values.
1.1. Contributions and Organization of this Paper
The purpose of this survey paper is to provide a generic overview of the
major reliability modeling and analysis techniques in the domain of commu-
nication networks. Based on the three kind of reliability analysis techniques,
we divide this survey into three broad parts: (i) analytical (ii) simulation
tools and (iii) formal methods. Each of these parts encompasses a com-
prehensive survey of using the underlying analysis technique with the three
reliability modeling techniques: RBDs, FTs, and MCs, in the context of com-
munication networks. The main focus of the paper is to study the utilization
of these modeling and analysis techniques in the domain of telecommunica-
tion networks and thus gain insights about the strengths and weaknesses of
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these methods and how to use them in the most effective manner.
It is important to note that the paper is unique compared to the existing
surveys and tutorials on reliability analysis [28, 29, 30, 7] due to its exclu-
sive focus on reliability modeling and analysis in communication networks.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study available that char-
acterizes the reliability analysis methods and also considers the recent trend
of using formal methods for reliability analysis. A discussion about the pros
and cons of reliability analysis and modeling techniques is also a prominent
aspect of this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe
the reliability models and their corresponding analysis methods, respectively.
Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the survey of reliability modeling and analysis of
communication network domain using RBD, FT, and MC, respectively. In
Section 7, we provide a graphical overview of the survey paper by using a
milestone timeline graph and an histogram plot. This section also presents
insights and critical analysis of the pros and cons of the various reliability
modeling and analysis approaches. Finally, the conclusion is presented in
Section 8. For better readability, the acronyms used in this paper are col-
lected in Table 1 as a convenient reference.
2. Reliability Models
Reliability assessment techniques can be utilized in every design phase
of the system or component including development, operation and mainte-
nance. FT and RBD based models are usually used to provide reliability and
availability estimates for both early and later stages of the design, where the
system models are more refined and have more detailed specifications com-
pared to the the early stage system models [31]. While on the other hand,
Markov chain based models are mainly used in the later design phase to per-
form trade-off analysis among different design alternatives when the detailed
specification of the design becomes available. In addition, when the system is
deployed, these modeling techniques can be beneficial in order to estimate the
frequency of maintenance and part replacement in the design, which allows
us to determine the life cost of the system elements or components.
This section provides a brief description about the reliability models,
i.e., Reliability Block Diagram, Fault Trees, Markov Chains and Bayesian
Networks. These models provide basis for conducting the reliability analysis
by using any one of the analysis approaches (analytical methods using paper-
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Table 1: Acronyms used in this paper.
Acronym Expanded Form Acronym Expanded Form
3RIS Resiliency, Reliability, Redun-
dancy by Infrastructure Sharing
MRM Markov Reward Modeling
B-ISDN Broadband Integrated Service
Network
OLSR Optimized Link State Routing
CBTC Communication-Based Train
Control System
PON Passive Optical Network
CCS Communication Control System RBD Reliability Block Diagram
CTMC Continuous Time Markov Chain RPM Randomised Pulse Modulation
DCN Data Communication System SAS Substation Automation System
DRBD Dynamic Reliability Block Dia-
gram
SCADA Supervision, Control and Data
Acquisition System
DTMC Discrete Time Markov Chain SEN Shuffle Exchange Networks
FASP Fast and Secure Protocol SNMP Simple Network Management
Protocol
FDDI Fiber Distributed-Data Interface SPC System Protection Center
FT Fault Tree SPN Stochastic Perti Nets
GPS Global Positioning System SRN Stochastic Reward Nets
GSPN General Stochastic Petri Nets TLR Trust Levels Routing Protocol
IABN Irregular Augmented Baseline
Network
VANETs Vehicular ad-hoc Networks
ICT Information Communication
Technology
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
LAN Local Area Network WAPS Wide Area Protection Communi-
cation System
LEO Low Earth Orbit WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
LPC Regional Protection Center WSN Wireless Sensor Network
MC Markov Chain
MINs Multistage Interconnection Net-
works
MAS Mission Avionics System
and-pencil based proofs, computer simulations or formal methods).
2.1. Reliability Block Diagrams
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) [32], depicted in Figure 2, are graph-
ical structures consisting of blocks and connector lines. The blocks usually
represent the system components and the connection of these components is
described by the connector lines. The input is given at one end of the RBD
and the output is observed at the other end. The system is functional, if at
least one path of properly functional components from input to output exists
otherwise it fails.
An RBD construction can follow any of these three basic patterns of
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 2: Reliability Block Diagram Configurations (a) Series (b) Parallel
(c) Parallel-Series (d) Series-Parallel (e) k -out-of-n
component connections: (i) series (ii) active redundancy or (iii) standby re-
dundancy. In the series connection, shown in Figure 2(a), all the components
should be functional for the system to be remain functional. Whereas, in ac-
tive redundancy all the component in the redundant stages must be in active
state. The components in active redundancy, shown in Figure 2(b), might be
connected in a parallel structure (Figure 2(b)) or a combination of series and
parallel structures as shown in Figures 2(c) and 3(d). In standby redundancy,
not all the components are required to be active. A k -out-of-n (Figure 2(e))
is an example of standby redundancy, in which only k components from n
components are supposed to be functional. The remaining components are
in the standby mode and can be made useful, if required.
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2.2. Fault Tree
Fault Tree (FT ) [33] is a graphical technique for analyzing the conditions
and the factors causing an undesired top event, i.e., a critical event, which
can cause the whole system failure upon its occurrence. These causes of
system failure are represented in the form of a tree rooted by the top event
as depicted in Figure 3. The preceding nodes of the fault tree are represented
by gates, which are used to link two or more cause events causing one fault
in a prescribed manner. For example, an OR FT gate can be used when
one fault suffices to enforce the fault. On the other hand, the AND FT
gate is used when all the cause events are essential for enforcing the fault.
Besides these gates, there are some other gates, such as exclusive OR FT
gate, priority FT gate and inhibit FT gate, which can be used to model the
occurrence of faults due to the corresponding cause events [33].
Once the fault tree model is constructed, both qualitative and quantita-
tive analysis can be carried out. A qualitative analysis in this context allows
the identification of all combinations of basic failure events, known as cut
sets, which can cause the top event to occur. The minimal cut sets (MCS)
are those cut sets that do not contain any subset of the basic cause events
that are still a cut set and are obtained by applying boolean algebraic opera-
tions on these cut sets. The smaller the number of basic cause events in these
cut set, the modeled system is considered to be more resilient to failures. The
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quantitative analysis is used to evaluate the probability of occurrence of top
event by considering these minimal cut sets which significantly contribute to
the system failures.
The Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) [34] is a type of FT that utilizes the
time-variant FT gates, such as Priority AND (PAND), the sequence enforc-
ing (SEQ), the standby or spare (SPARE), and the functional dependency
(FDEP). These gates extend the traditional FT gates functionality as they
can be used to model the dynamic behavior as well as the order of failure
in a given system. For example, the PAND FT gate is considered to be at
the failure state when all of its input components fail in a pre-assigned order
(not forcibly), i.e., failure occurs from left to right in graphical notion. The
SEQ FT gate forces the failure in a pre-assigned order and the SPARE FT
gate models the substitution of one or more principle components with that
of spare components having the same functionality [34].
2.3. Markov Chain
A Markov chain [35] is a stochastic process that consists of a set of states,
i.e., S = {s0, s1, ..., sn}, and arcs, which are used to point the transition from
one state to another. The initial state sini and the probability pij represent
the starting state and the transition probability from state si to state sj,
respectively. As shown in the example of Figure 4, the process starts from
an initial state and transitions from the current state to the next state occur
on the basis of transition probabilities, which only depend upon the current
state. This provides the basis for Markov model and it is also known as the
Markov or the memoryless property.
Pij
PjlPlj
Pkl
Plk
Pki Pik
Pji
i j
k l
Figure 4: A Discrete Time Markov Chain Example
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Markov chains are usually classified into two categories: Discrete Time
Markov Chains (DTMC) and Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) [36].
Markovian models are frequently utilized for reliability analysis in scenarios
where failure or repair events can occur at any point in time [35]. Similarly,
the semi-Markov model [37], which involves the concept of state and state
transition, has also been used for the reliability analysis of the systems. The
distinguishing feature of the semi-Markov models, compared to the Markov
models, is that the transitions and the probability distributions depend on
the time spent by a system at its present state [35]. In other words, the
transition from the current state to the next state not only depends upon
the transition probability but also the holding time, which is the time spent
by a system at a current state. Moreover, the transition probabilities in a
semi-Markov model can be non-exponential [35].
Markov modeling has also been utilized for analyzing the dynamic behav-
ior of the other reliability models, i.e., RBD and FT. The notion of dynamic
behavior, for reliability analysis, represents the evolution of system topol-
ogy/configuration with respect of time. In case of the Dynamic Reliability
Block Diagram (DRBD) [38], the system is modeled in terms of states of
the component and the evolution of these components states is carried out
by a sequence of events [38]. A typical DRBD contains the following states:
(i) Active: the state of proper functioning of the component (ii) Failed : the
failure state of the component (iii) Standby : the state depicting the case
when the component is not in functional or in active condition but it can be
activated. In addition, there are other states such as Hot, Warm and Cold,
representing the conditions when the system or component is disabled but en-
ergized, partially disabled and completely disabled, respectively. Also, there
are some basic types of events for DRBD like Failure, Wake-up, Sleep and
Standby switch, representing the events from active to failure state, standby
to active state, active to standby state and transition between two standby
states, respectively [38].
2.4. Bayesian Network Models
RBD and FT models fail to describe the system behavior when the compo-
nent interaction of a system cannot be precisely defined. Bayesian networks
(BN) [39] allow us to cater for this problem by defining the component inter-
actions probabilistically. Mathematically, a BN is a directed acyclic graph
where the nodes represent a variable and the edges between the nodes rep-
resent the casual relationship between the nodes, as shown in Figure 5. The
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top most nodes, X1, X2 and X4 representing the system components 1, 2
and 4, respectively, do not have any incoming edges therefore, they are con-
ditionally independent of the rest of the components in the system. The
probabilities that are assigned to these nodes should be known beforehand.
This information can either be obtained with the help of a domain expert or
using existing statistical data about the system. In the reliability analysis
prospective, the variables in a BN are defined to represent system compo-
nents and the edges or links represent the component interactions, which lead
to the system failure or success [40].
x1 x2 x4
x3 x5
System Behavior
Figure 5: A Sample Bayesian Network
3. Reliability Analysis Techniques
Traditionally, reliability analysis has been done using analytical approaches
based on the paper-and-pencil proof methods and sampling-based computer
simulations. However, these methods cannot ascertain absolute correctness
due to their inherent limitations of incompleteness and error-prone nature.
Formal methods have been recently proposed for the reliability analysis as
well. However, these methods have a limited scope and thus cannot be used
to analyze all kinds of complex engineering systems. In this section, we
provide a brief overview about the above-mentioned reliability analysis tech-
niques. Based on this description, a concise comparison between them is also
presented in Section 7.
3.1. Analytical
The main idea behind this approach is to analytically verify generic ex-
pressions for the reliability of the given system based on paper-and-pencil
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based proofs conducted by humans. Each reliability modeling technique,
explained in Section 2, can be analytically analyzed to obtain equivalent
mathematical expressions, which can be specialized to conduct the reliabil-
ity analysis of the systems.
3.1.1. Reliability Block Diagram Analysis
RBD analysis can be used to conduct both qualitative and quantitative
analysis of the systems. The former deals with the identification of critical
or weak components of the given system. While in the latter, the relia-
bility of the overall system is calculated on the basis of reliability of the
individual components. All RBD configurations, shown in Figure 2, have
an associated standard mathematical reliability equation which can be easily
manipulated for conducting reliability analysis of large systems. Following
are the reliability expressions for series, parallel, parallel-series, series-parallel
and k-out-of-n RBD configurations, respectively:
Rseries(t) = Pr(
N⋂
i=1
Ai(t)) =
N∏
i=1
Ri(t) (1)
Rparallel(t) = Pr(
N⋃
i=1
Ai(t)) = 1−
N∏
i=1
(1−Ri(t)) (2)
Rparallel−series = Pr(
M⋃
i=1
N⋂
j=1
Aij(t)) = 1−
M∏
i=1
(1−
N∏
j=1
(Rij(t))) (3)
Rseries−parallel = Pr(
N⋂
i=1
M⋃
j=1
Aij(t)) =
N∏
i=1
(1−
M∏
j=1
(1−Rij(t))) (4)
Rk|n(t) = Pr(∪ni=k{exactly i components functioning})
= Σni=k(
(
n
k
)
Ri(1−R)n−1)
(5)
whereAi(t) represents the reliability event associated with the i
th sub-component
of the system, Ri(t) andRij(t) represent the reliability of the i
th sub-component
connected in series or parallel RBD configuration and the reliability of jth
sub-component connected in the ith level of series-parallel or parallel-series
RBD configuration, respectively. The symbol R in Equation 5 represents the
reliability of the identical components that are connected in the k-out-of-n
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RBD structure. These equations (Eq. 1–5) can be utilized for availability
analysis by replacing the reliability event with the availability event and vice
versa [41].
Divide System into Sub-
components
Construct Reliability Block 
Diagrams (RBDs)
Assign Failure Distribution to 
Each Sub-component
Evaluate Overall System 
Reliability 
RBD Mathematical Expressions
Start
Figure 6: Reliability Block Diagram Analysis Process
The analytical RBD-based reliability analysis process is illustrated in Fig-
ure 6 and it begins by the logical partitioning of the system into its com-
ponents. This partitioning may be based on functional behavior or actual
connections of the components in the system. This is followed by the con-
struction of an RBD and the assignment of failure distribution to each indi-
vidual component. Usually, the Exponential or Weibull distributions, with
failure rate λ and time-to-failure random variable, say X, are used in order
to express the reliability or availability of these individual components. The
dependability of each component is then used in order to determine the re-
liability or availability of the overall system by utilizing the mathematical
expressions that are presented in Equations 1-5.
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3.1.2. Fault Tree Analysis
In Fault Tree analysis (FTA), each FT gate has an associated failure prob-
ability expression as shown in Table 2. These expressions can be utilized to
evaluate the reliability of the system. The first step in the FTA, as illus-
trated in Figure 7, is the construction of the FT of the given system. This is
followed by the assignment of the failure distributions to basic cause-events
and the identification of the Minimal Cut Set (MCS) failure events, which
contribute in the occurrence of the top event. These MCS failure events are
generally modeled in terms of the Exponential or Weibull random variables
and the Probabilistic Inclusion-Exclusion (PIE) principle [11] is then used to
evaluate the probability of failure of the given system.
Mathematically, the PIE can be expressed as follows:
P (
N⋃
i=1
Ai) = Σ
N
k=1((−1)k−1ΣI⊂{1,...,n}&|I|=kP (
⋂
i∈I
)Ai) (6)
where Ai corresponds to the i
th cut set event.
Construct Fault Tree
Determine Failure Probability 
of Basic Events 
Identifying and Assessing 
Minimal Cut Sets (MCS)
Evaluate Overall System 
Failure Probability
Failure Expression of Fault Tree 
Gates
Start
Figure 7: Procedure of Conducting Fault Tree Analysis
16
Table 2: Probability of Failure of Fault Tree Gates
Fault Tree Gates Failure Probability Expressions
FAND gate(t) = Pr(
N⋂
i=2
Ai(t)) =
N∏
i=2
Fi(t)
FOR gate(t) = Pr(
N⋃
i=2
Ai(t)) = 1−
N∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t))
FNOR(t) = 1− FOR(t) =
N∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t))
FNAND(t) = Pr(
k⋂
i=2
Ai(t) ∩
N⋂
j=k
Ai(t))
=
k∏
i=2
(1− Fi(t)) ∗
N∏
j=k
(Fj(t))
FXOR(t) = Pr(A¯(t)B(t) ∪ A(t)B¯(t))
= FA(t)(1− FB(t)) + FB(t)(1− FA(t))
FNOT (t) = Pr(A(t)) = (1− FA(t))
3.1.3. Markov Analysis
It is a stochastic process X(t) which is defined over the discrete state-
space ω. A process X(t) can be considered as a Markov process only if, given
the sequence of time instants (0 < t1 < t2...tm), the probability of a system
being at state x(m) at time instant tm is only dependent upon the previously
occupied state x(m−1) at time instant tm−1. This property provides the basis
for Markov process and is known as the Markov property. Mathematically,
it can be expressed as:
Pr(X(tm) = x
(m)|X(tm−1) = x(m−1), ..., X(t1) = x(1))
=Pr(X(tm) = x
(m)|X(tm−1) = x(m−1))
(7)
For DTMC, these time instants are discrete while in CTMC they are contin-
uous.
The main steps involved in the Markov chain analysis process are shown
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Define Failure Events
Define Critical System 
Components Associated with 
the Events
Define Markov Model 
Elements
Combine System Components 
with Equivalent Failure Effects
Start
Assign Failure Rates to Markov 
Elements
Compute Markov Model State 
Transition Based on 
Redundancy Management
Applying Simplifying 
Techniques to Reduce Number 
of States
Define Initial State Probabilities 
and Run Markov Model 
Evaluate Overall System 
Reliability 
Figure 8: Markov Chain Analysis Design Process
in Figure 8. The process starts from defining the failure events and the
identification of critical system components of the system. This is followed by
first defining the basic Markov model elements of the critical components of
the system and then assigning the failure probabilities to these basic elements.
It is usual that the states in the Markov model are very large so the next
steps involves the reduction of state-space of the Markov model by using a
theorem [42], which states that given the steady-state probabilities of original
Markov chain, the probabilities for smaller chain are proportional to the
corresponding states in the original Markov chain. When the modeling is
complete, the analysis starts by defining the initial probabilities and then
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running the system to evaluate the overall system reliability or availability.
3.1.4. Fuzzy Logic
The system reliability analysis often requires the use of uncertain data,
subjective judgment and the approximate system models. Fuzzy logic [43]
provides an effective tool for reliability analysis when the analysis does not
require precision or accurate results. Fuzzy logic can be considered as the
generalization of classical logic and is used to model those systems in which
the data used is not precise or the inference rules are formulated in a very
general way [44]. In classical propositional logic [45], there are only two
values 0 or 1, while the fuzzy logic provides the whole continuum of truth
values for propositional logic.
A fuzzy logic is characterized by a set known as FuzzySet and its asso-
ciated member function. A membership function is used to assign degree of
membership to each member x ∈ X. Consider a membership function λ(x)
on interval [0,1], where 0 represents the absence of membership of element x
in the fuzzy set A and 1 represents the complete membership in set A. While,
the values between 0 and 1 show the partial membership of the element x in
the fuzzy set A. Mathematically, it can be written as:
A = {(x, λ(x))|x ∈ X ∧ 0 ≤ λ(x) ≤ 1} (8)
In reliability analysis, the evaluation of probability of a system either
working correctly or in the state of failure is our prime concern. However, in
reality, their may be a situation in which system performance degrades before
it enters in a failure state and in between there are ranges of states in which
the system is partially functional. For the aforementioned situation, the fuzzy
logic has been found to be in a better position to define the reliability events
for a given system. Fuzzy logic can provide reliability analysis by utilizing
RBD [44] or FT [46] models.
3.1.5. Bayesian Network Analysis
In a Bayesian Network (BN), the dependency of a component can be
determined by the link between two nodes in a child parent relationship. The
child represents the dependent component of the parent node. Therefore,
the success of the child node is conditional on the success probability of
the parent node. The Bayes theorem [47] is used to evaluate the conditional
probabilities of the child node by considering the probability value associated
with the parent node. Also, if the link between any two nodes is absent then
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it represents that these components do not interact for system failure and
can be considered as independent. So the probabilities of these components
should be evaluated separately.
Consider a BN over U = X1, X2, ..., Xn whereX1, X2, ..., Xn are the nodes.
Then, based on the chain rule, the joint probability Pr{X1, X2, ..., Xn} is
given as follows [48]:
Pr(U) = Pr{X1, X2, ..., Xn} =
n∏
i=1
Pr(Xi|pii) (9)
where pii is the set of parents of node Xi. The probability distribution of
a random variable at a particular node can be found by marginalizing the
joint probability distribution, which is presented in Equation 9. This pro-
cess is known as marginalization and it can be used to compute the failure
probability and reliability of the given systems [48].
3.2. Simulation Tools
Numerical methods based simulation tools have been extensively utilized
for the reliability analysis of communication networks. The main idea behind
these tools is to model the random phenomena by using pseudo-random num-
ber generation methods and thus use them to depict probability distributions
of failures in reliability analysis. Thereafter, numerical analysis techniques
can be used to judge the overall reliability of the given model, i.e., RBD,
FT or MC, using its corresponding mathematical relationship, verified using
the analytical methods described above. There are many simulation based
reliability analysis tools, which are commercially available and provide many
attractive features including graphical editors in which complex systems can
be modeled with great ease. These tools take the system reliability model
and associated system components failure distributions as an input from the
user and return the overall reliability or failure probability of the system
numerically. The details of some of these tools are as follows:
3.2.1. SHARPE
Symbolic Hierarchical Automated, Reliability and Performance Evaluator
(SHARPE ) [49] is a toolkit which can be used to analyze reliability, avail-
ability and performability of systems. It supports combinatorial reliability
techniques, such as FTs and RBD, as well as state-based modeling tech-
niques, such as Markov chain. SHARPE also allows users to choose among
different reliability analysis techniques and can provide results in the form of
a distribution function or as a mean and probability.
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3.2.2. Isograph
Isograph [50] provides a package of software, such as Availability Work-
bench, HAZOP+, NAP and AttackTree+, which are capable of providing
analysis for reliability, maintainability, availability and safety [50]. They uti-
lize the reliability modeling techniques, such as FT and RBD, to predict
the reliability, throughput and life cycle cost of the system. Isograph allows
modeling the system concisely in an easy to understand graphical format.
3.2.3. RAPTOR
In this tool, the graphical user interface allows the user to draw the RBDs
and describe the components failure or repair behavior [51]. The user can
place the components and make the connection between these components
using the links and the nodes. Any combination of series-parallel RBD struc-
tures can be designed using the powerful workspace provided by RAPTOR.
The failure behavior of the system or components can be described by using
16 built-in distributions. RAPTOR can provide reliability prediction and
availability and maintainability analysis. In addition, it supports life cost
analysis and sensitivity analysis as well.
3.2.4. ReliaSoft
Like Isograph, ReliaSoft also provides a wide variety of software, such as
WEIBULL++, ALTA, DOE++ and BLOCKSIM [52]. The main features
provided by these software tools are system reliability analysis, identification
of critical components, optimum reliability allocation, system availability
analysis and throughput calculation. In addition, these tools provide a user-
friendly interface to utilize complex and powerful mathematical models for
quantitative accelerated life testing data analysis.
3.2.5. Galileo
Galileo [53] is a dynamic fault tree modeling and analysis tool that com-
bines the binary decision diagram (BDD) and Markov methods with rich user
interfaces. Some distinguishing features of the tool are: (i) Users can edit
a fault tree in either a textual or graphical representation; (ii) It provides
very usefull editing features, such as zoom, find-and-replace, print preview,
cut-and-paste; and (ii) It comes with a very comprehensive on-line documen-
tation through an embedded internet browser and World-Wide Web pages.
A part from above mentioned tools, some XML-based specification, like
OPC unified architecture [54], has been developed to realise the communi-
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cation among industrial applications. The main feature is to analyze the
overhead of client/server data exchanges.
3.3. Formal Methods
Formal methods [55] are computer-based mathematical analysis tech-
niques. The main idea is to represent the system’s behavior and its de-
sired properties in appropriate logical frameworks and develop a relationship
between these two by mathematical reasoning or rigorous state exploration
techniques in a computer. This rigorous analysis approach of these tech-
niques allow us to verify the system’s properties in a more thorough fashion
than that of empirical testing. In this section, we describe a brief overview
of some formal methods that have been utilized extensively for the reliability
analysis of communication networks.
3.3.1. Model Checking
Model checking [56] is one of the most commonly used formal verification
techniques for the verification of finite-state concurrent systems, such as se-
quential circuit designs and communication protocols. In this technique, a
given system is first represented as a finite state automata M and then the
verification is done by verifying temporal logic formulas φ exhaustively over
the complete state-space of M [56].
M |= φ (10)
Model checking [56] has been increasingly utilized for analyzing safety
and mission critical applications and it has gained significant popularity in
the industry because the verification process can be fully automated and
counterexamples are automatically generated if the property being verified
does not hold [57]. However, the state-space explosion problem [57], i.e.,
the problem of dealing with the computational overhead of exhaustive state-
exploration of complex systems, is one of the inherent limitations of this
technique.
PRISM [58] is an open-source probabilistic model checker, which has been
extensively used for the reliability analysis of a variety of communication
systems. It provides support for building and analyzing several types of
probabilistic models, such as discrete and continuous-time Markov chains,
Markov decision processes, and extensions of these models with rewards.
PRISM constructs the corresponding probabilistic model of the given system
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in the form of states and transitions. For reliability analysis, the states
represent the functioning or failure of the system or its components and
transitions represent a possible evolution of the system from one configuration
or failure to another over time. Transitions are labeled with quantitative
information, such as failure rates of exponential distributions. Once this
probabilistic model is constructed, it can be used to analyze a wide range of
quantitative properties, related to reliability, of the original system.
3.3.2. Petri Nets
Petri Net (PN) [59] is a bipartite directed graph consisting of disjoint
sets of places P and transitions T . The former, which is represented by
circles, models the condition while the latter, signified by bars, represents
the events or activities that may occur in the system. The directed arcs
(PXT ) and (TXP ), represented by arrows, describe the input places P for
the transitions T and output places P for the transitions T , respectively.
Places may be empty or contain more than one token that is drawn by a
block dot and term marking represents the tokens over the set of places.
A transition is said to be enabled, in a given marking, if all its input
places contain at least one token. An enabled transition can be fired and as
a result a token will be removed from the input places of the transition and
added to its output places.
A stochastic variant of a Petri Net is commonly used for the reliability
analysis [60]. A Stochastic Petri Net (SPN), based on CTMC, is a timed PN
where each transition is characterized by an exponential random variable. A
reward function can be used to define the reliability metrics of an SPN based
model as follows:
rm =
{
1 if M ∈ O
0 if M ∈ F (11)
where rm is a state reward, which splits the set of reachable markings of an
SPN into two subsets: O represents the operational state of the system and F
represents the failure state. The instantaneous steady state and the interval
availability metrics can be calculated using this state reward function.
A stochastic activity networks (SAN) [61, 62], i.e., a variant of SPN, are
specifically being developed for performance, dependability, and performa-
bility evaluation of a wide range of real-world systems. For instance, an
integrated modeling approach for fault tolerant systems based on SAN has
been used for the evaluation of systems performance parameters, such as re-
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liability, availability and maintenance costs [63]. Similarly, the Hierarchical
Stochastic Activity Networks (HASN), an extension of SAN, has been used
to quantitatively analyze the performance of QoS for intensive video traffic
over the 802.11e standard used in WLANs [64]. SANs have also been used
to analyse the performance of the KNXnet/IP congestion control mechanism
[65].
In Colored Petri Nets (CPN) [66], labels are used to distinguish tokens and
it allows to implement different firing policies for different tokens. Moreover,
a CPN can provide a dynamic change of the token labeling by specifying
different labels to the tokens when they enter and leave the transitions. The
ability of a CPN to move a token through a transition among the places
while altering the labels during this process provides a flexible and powerful
mechanism of tracking relevant changes in the system [67]. This mechanism
allows the PN to model commonly captured behaviors of RBD and FT [68].
3.3.3. Higher-order-Logic Theorem Proving
Higher-order Logic (HOL) is a system of deduction with a precise seman-
tics and is expressive enough to model any system that can be expressed in
a closed mathematical form. Moreover, in conjunction with general purpose
proof assistant, such as Coq [69], PVS [70] and HOL4 [71], HOL can be uti-
lized to develop automatic and interactive proof environments for reasoning
about system properties. The formal analysis carried out in this manner is
logically sound and provides an irrefutable proof that a system satisfies its
requirements.
A number of higher-order-logic formalizations of probability theory are
available in higher-order logic (e.g., [72, 73, 74]) and have been utilized to
verify sampling algorithms of a number of commonly used discrete [72] and
continuous random variables [75] based on their probabilistic and statistical
properties [76, 77]. Moreover, this formalization has been used to conduct
the reliability analysis of a number of applications, such as memory arrays
[78], soft errors [79], electronic components [80] and oil and gas pipelines [81].
4. Reliability Analysis of Communication Networks with RBDMod-
els
As described earlier in Section 2, RBD provides a graphical model of
a system by representing its components as blocks and their interrelation-
ship by using the directed lines between the blocks. This obtained graphical
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model can then be utilized to evaluate overall system reliability by using its
individual component reliability. RBD models have been extensively utilized,
due to their ability to represent complex systems in a simplified graphical
form, for the reliability analysis of communication networks, including wire-
less sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, cellular networks, multiple computer
networks, cloud computing and power grid communication networks. This
section primarily presents a survey on the RBD-based reliability analysis in
the domain of communication networks. The information is classified on the
basis of reliability analysis techniques, i.e., analytical, simulation tools and
formal methods.
4.1. Analytical Methods with RBD
Fault tolerance [82] has been an extensively utilized approach in commu-
nication networks. The main idea is to mask the expected network faults
by using additional standby network components. Similarly, the nodes in
the communication networks, such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs), mul-
tistage interconnection networks (MINs), optical network and bus architec-
ture, are made redundant by connecting extra nodes in series or parallel to
the underlying network, thus making these networks tolerant to faults. Con-
sequently, the reliability of communication networks is significantly increased
because a standby node can replace any node that stops working. RBD-based
models are extensively utilized to carry out the reliability analysis of these
fault tolerant communication networks. For example, the fault tolerance ap-
proach has been used on the wireless sensor nodes of a WSN [83] with the
objective of making the network more reliable. To observe the effects of fault
tolerance on network reliability, the sensor nodes are modeled with a series-
parallel RBD configuration in this case. Similarly RBDs have been used to
assess the reliability of many other fault tolerant communication networks
including wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [84], multistage interconnection
networks (MINs) [85], wide area networks (WANs) [86], numerical protection
systems [87] and electric power communication networks [88].
One of the essential performance parameters of any communication net-
work is its ability to reliably transmit the communication data. Therefore,
many techniques have been developed to improve the reliability of the data
transmission in communication networks at the software as well as hardware
levels. Some of the commonly used methodologies include applying filters
on the data to mitigate the irrelevant data [89], data transmission strategies
[90] [91], making the systems fault tolerant [92] and introducing feedback
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systems [93]. For reliability analysis of these kinds of enhanced communi-
cation network systems, RBDs have been found to be more preferable than
other modeling techniques due to their ability to effectively capture the effect
of failures of individual network components upon the overall network. In
WSNs, data transmission mechanism is improved by applying various oper-
ations on the data which include data retransmission, filtering out the irrele-
vant data, removing extra information and checking the vulnerability of the
data [94]. Since, these operations are applied on the data one-by-one so RBD
can model these operations using a combination of series and parallel RBD
configurations. Similarly, in the case of multistage interconnection networks
(MINs), the data transmission system is made reliable by using switching
stages, which have been modeled by using series-parallel and parallel-series
RBD configurations [95].
RBDs have also been used to predict the level of reliability required to
mitigate the performance degradation effects, including unreliable data trans-
mission, service unavailability, components dependencies and inappropriate
data throughput, in many communication networks [96], such as network
service systems [97] and smart grid stations [98]. For instance in smart grid
substations, the information and communication technology (ICT) infras-
tructure is usually comprised of components, such as meters and antennas,
which are dependant on each other and thus their reliability dependancy
has been captured using the series-parallel RBD configuration to analyze the
reliability and availability of the ICT infrastructure [98].
The reliability of communication protocols, which are primarily a set of
rules that make communication effective and reliable between nodes or sys-
tems, has also been extensively studied using RBDs [99] [100] [101]. Similarly,
RBDs have also been used to evaluate the reliability of newly designed pro-
tocols, such as reliable energy-efficient cluster-based protocol (REECP) and
routing protocol for WSNs [102] [103]. For instance, the reliability of the
cluster-based communication protocol REECP, which effectively reduces the
energy consumption of a WSN, is evaluated by modeling the cluster heads
and sensor nodes with series, parallel and series parallel RBD configurations
[102].
Network topologies are the schematic arrangements of the network com-
ponents to establish an efficient communication system. Network topologies
have an immense effect on the reliability of communication systems and thus
it is required to adopt the most reliable network topology for a particular
network [104]. To observe the effects of a network topology on the network
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reliability, RBD modeling techniques are very commonly used. The topol-
ogy is transformed into a RBD model by modeling the network nodes with
the most suitable configuration. For instance, in multi-computer systems, a
hypercube topology of the processing elements (PEs) is established to make
the interconnection network (IN) fault tolerant. The hypercube computer
network is then modeled with RBD configurations and analyzed analytically
for the reliability evaluation of multi-computer system [105].
Ethernet architecture based communication networks have been devel-
oped to introduce interoperability among communication devices supplied
by different vendors in substation automation systems (SAS) [106]. The
reliability and availability of these ethernet architectures is assessed using
the series-parallel RBD configuration [106] in order to analyze the overall
reliability and performance of the communication system of SAS.
Fuzzy logic [44] and Bayesian networks [107] can further extend the anal-
ysis capabilities of RBD models and thus have been used in conducting re-
liability analysis of communication networks. The Bayesian network based
RBD technique can model the dynamic nature of the systems and the fuzzy
RBD hybrid technique can model the uncertainties of the system. Bayesian
network based RBD approach is also utilized to evaluate the reliability of
complex communication networks by centering the complex parts of the sys-
tem by its unique reverse reasoning technique. Moreover, Bayesian networks
also facilitate to capture the probabilistic interaction of the network compo-
nents. For instance, in wide area protection system [108], the reliability of
the communication system depends on the subsystems that are system pro-
tection centered, backbone networks and regional communication systems.
These subsystems are first modeled with RBDs and then their RBD models
are transformed into their corresponding Bayesian networks for reliability
analysis. The polytree system has been analyzed on the same lines in [109].
Fuzzy logic based RBD approach can effectively model the complex systems
that pose linguistic uncertainties. It can be utilized to evaluate the reliability
as well as the lifetime of the systems. For instance in WSNs, the behavior
of the lifetime of a single sensor node follows normal Gaussian distribution
and hence it is modeled as a Gaussian membership function with uncertain
standard deviation for the reliability and lifetime analysis of WSN [110].
4.2. Simulation Based Analysis with RBD
Simulation tools, such as Galileo [111], HARP [112] and SHARPE [113],
have been found to be very effective for the reliability analysis of large com-
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munication systems with many nodes.
Communication networks, such as vehicular ad-hoc networks [114], ICT
infrastructures [115] and VoIP based communication systems [116], are very
complex as they are composed of many sub-systems, such as hardware sys-
tems, software systems, virtualized systems, communication mediums etc.
Failure in any system may lead the whole network to move to some undesir-
able state. Reliability analysis of these systems to ascertain the effect of a
sub-system or a component failure to the overall system is a matter of prime
concern. RBDs are considered to be quite preferable to model such kind
of complex networks for their reliability evaluation and the analysis can be
made easy by using simulation tools. For instance, the failure behavior of
hardware components of on board unit (OBU) and road side unit (RSU) of
VANETs [114] have been used with series and series-parallel RBD configura-
tions in the SHARPE software tool to evaluate the reliability of the overall
system. Similarly, for large communication networks, such as SCADA sys-
tem of a power grid station, which consist of many nodes and links, the RBD
based reliability analysis is conducted using the ITEM simulation tool [117].
Many communication networks [118] [119] are error prone and exhibit
some repairing strategies either on component level or on system level. Net-
works with repairing strategies are complex and thus their reliability assess-
ment becomes quite challenging. Since, RBD can model the fundamental
components of any system with their failure and repair rates, it is considered
to be a more preferable approach to model the networks with repairing strate-
gies. For instance in a long haul network [119], the three repairing/protection
strategies, which include span protection, path protection and protection cy-
cle, are modeled with RBD and reliability analysis is conducted using Monte
Carlo simulation.
4.3. Formal Methods with RBD
The higher-order logic theorem prover HOL4 has been used for RBD
analysis and some preliminary results related to the reliability analysis of
oil and gas pipelines, composed of serially connected sub-components, are
reported in [81]. In particular, this work utilizes the probability theory [120],
available in the HOL4 theorem prover, to formalize reliability, the exponen-
tial random variable and the series RBD. These foundations are then used
to formally verify a generic expression of a simple pipeline structure that can
be modeled as a series RBD with an exponential failure time for individual
segments. Recently, this work is extended for the formalization of commonly
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used RBDs, which is then utilized to conduct formal reliability analysis of
a complex virtual data center [121]. The HOL formalization of RBDs has
also been used for availability analysis of satellite solar arrays [122]. To our
best knowledge, none of the work present in the current literature utilizes
theorem proving for the reliability analysis of communication networks.
Petri Nets and its variants are widely used as a reliability analysis tool
in the domain of communication networks due to their ability to efficiently
handle large problems of dynamic nature. For instance, the live migration
process in cloud computing networks makes the system dynamic and thus
yields to a complex RBD model, which can be effectively handled using Petri
Nets with the support of commercial tools, such as SNOOPY [123] and
CPN [124]. Given the dynamic nature of visualization, due to the presence
of hardware systems, software systems, live migration techniques, resource
allocation algorithms and concurrent failures, virtualized networks are fre-
quently modeled with RBDs, which are then transformed to Petri Nets for
the reliability analysis [125] [126] [127]. The reliability of communication
networks with redundancy mechanisms has also been efficiently analysed us-
ing RBD based Petri Nets [128] [129]. Similarly, given the dynamic nature
of Service of Supervision, Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA)
communication of power grid stations, their availability is also analysed us-
ing Petri Nets [117]. Power management polices, such as sleep/wake policies,
greatly reduce the power consumption of the overall communication network
but the behavior of the network becomes dynamic and thus Petri Nets can be
used for the reliability analysis of such systems. For example, the reliability
analysis of WSNs that work on sleep/wake policies has been done by captur-
ing the dynamic behavior of the sensor nodes by a DRBD model, which is
transformed into Petri Nets for easy analysis. Petri Nets have also been used
to ensure the security/safety aspects of networks in terms of reliability and
availability by analyzing the safety/security aspects of network protocols,
such as internet voting systems [130] and high-speed trains [131]. Petri Nets
are also used quite frequently to estimate the capacity of the communication
networks required to meet the needs of the customers. For this purpose, the
Petri Nets based reliability analysis of the designed network architecture is
performed [132] [133].
A summary of the literature on reliability assessment of communication
networks using RBD-based modeling with analysis performed through an-
alytical and simulation methods for RBD models is presented in Table 3
whereas the literature involving reliability analysis using formal methods is
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summarized in Table 4.
Table 3: Representative summary of RBD-based reliability assessments using
various Analytical/Simulation analysis techniques
Network Char-
acteristic
Ref. Brief summary
Fault Tolerance [83] A fault tolerant WSN system is modeled using
the series-parallel configuration of RBD
[84] A framework is presented to incorporate the
data transmission problem and is modeled us-
ing the series configuration of RBD
[85] The pars network, i.e., a fault tolerant inter-
connection network, is presented and its reli-
ability analysis is performed using RBD
[86] The reliability analysis of different protection
systems, for the PON architecture, is per-
formed using RBD technique
[87] The reliability analysis of smart grid substa-
tion is performed using the RBD technique
while considering the dynamic behavior of the
systems
[88] The reliability analysis of different bus ar-
chitectures, which are deployed in substation
communication system, is performed using the
RBD technique
Data Transmission
System
[94] The data transmission process of the WSN
is presented and modeled using parallel-series
configuration of RBD
[95] The reliability of SEN is analyzed using RBD
and the impact of switching stages on reliabil-
ity is observed
[106] The RBD-based reliability and availability
of smart grid substation automation system
is analyzed by considering various Ethernet
switch architectures
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Dependence [96] The availability analysis of devices which
are responsible for telecommunication, is per-
formed using RBD technique In addition, dif-
ferent failure scenarios are also incorporated
[97] RBD-based methodology is presented for the
reliability analysis of general network systems
[98] reliability analysis of complex communication
network, that works inside the power grid sys-
tem, is performed using RBD technique
Network Protocols [102] A communication protocol is presented and
modeled using series-parallel configuration of
RBD
[103] An evaluation model is presented to incorpo-
rate power consumption
Network Topolo-
gies
[105] The reliability of computer systems connected
with each other through hypercube topology
is analyzed using RBD technique
Dynamic Behavior [108] A Bayesian network based RBD analysis of
the WAP system, with dynamic behavior, is
presented for reliability and availability eval-
uation
[109] A Bayesian network based RBD analysis of
bridge network and power plant network, hav-
ing dependant failure, is presented for reliabil-
ity evaluation
[110] A fuzzy based RBD model of a sensor network
is presented and its reliability is analyzed
Failure
Prone Hard-
ware/Software
Components
[114] The reliability analysis of VANETs system is
performed by simulating its RBD model using
SHARPE software The RBD model presented
in the paper also captures the characteristics
of the network channel as well as the hardware
failure scenarios
[115] The reliability and availability of an ICT-
infrastructure system is analyzed by simulat-
ing its RBD model using Isographs Reliability
Workbench
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[116] The reliability analysis of VoIP network is per-
formed by simulating its RBD model using
RAPTOR tool
[117] The availability analysis of SCADA communi-
cation links, which are integral part of a power
grid station, is performed by simulating its
RBD model using ITEM software
Repairing Strate-
gies
[118] A methodology is presented for the reliability
analysis of complex communication network
using GPSSworld simulation tool
[119] A Monte Carlo simulation based reliability
and availability analysis of long haul network
is presented
Table 4: Representative summary of RBD-based reliability assessments using
various Formal Methods
Network
Characteristics
Ref. Brief summary
Fault Tolerance [128] A stochastic Petri Nets based RBD analysis
of enterprise network is performed for its reli-
ability evaluation
[134] The reliability and availability analysis of en-
terprise network is performed by using RBD
technique where the RBD models are solved
through Petri Nets for analysis
Failure
Prone Hard-
ware/Software,
Power Consump-
tion, Safety
[125] The reliability and availability analysis of vir-
tualized network resource allocation algorithm
is performed through RBD modeling where
the RBD model is then transformed into petri
nets for analysis
[126] An RBD and SPN based methodology is pre-
sented for the reliability and availability anal-
ysis of virtualized network
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[127] The reliability and availability analysis of vir-
tual data center, which is an integral part
of cloud computing, is performed using RBD
technique and the RBD model is converted
into SPN for analysis
[135] The dynamic behavior of the sensors such
as, sleep/wake policies are captured through
DRBD and analyzed through Petri Nets for
reliability evaluation of WSNs
[130] The reliability and availability analysis of in-
ternet voting system is performed by modeling
the system through RBD and the RBD model
is then converted into SPN for analysis
[131] A safety communication protocol of EURO-
RADIO train is modeled using RBD technique
and analyzed using SPN
5. Reliability Analysis of Communication Networks with Fault Trees
Besides RBD, FT is an another widely utilized reliability analysis tech-
nique, which is mainly used to model the failure relationships among the
communication system components and the effect of failure of components
towards the overall communication system failure. In this section, we present
a comprehensive survey of FT reliability analysis technique in the domain
of communication networks. Similar to the RBD survey, in Section 4, this
survey is further classified on the basis of analysis methods, i.e., analytical,
simulation tools and formal methods.
5.1. Analytical Methods with Fault Tree
For a communication network to be functioning properly, it is essen-
tial that its critical components, i.e., the components whose failure leads to
the severe degradation in the performance of the whole communication net-
work, are functioning properly. Fault Tree (FT) models allow us to observe
the effects of these network component’s failure on the overall reliability of
the communication system. For example, the automated highways system
(AHS), which is used to provide highest efficiency and safety to the railway
33
transportation, consists of many critical components, such as data acquisition
system, transmitter and communication system between successive vehicles.
The impact of failure of these AHS components on the overall system fail-
ure has been modeled by using FT gates and analyzed analytically [136].
Similarly, the failure analysis of two schemes of transmission line protection
system, which includes radial line protection scheme and Permissive Over-
reaching Transfer Trip (POTT) scheme, has been performed by modeling the
critical components of the schemes using a FT [137]. Similarly, FT is also
effectively used to observe the effects of a network topology on the overall net-
work reliability. For instance, the reliability of the Fiber Distributed-Data
Interface (FDDI) token ring topology of a local area network (LAN) has been
analyzed by using FT modeling [138].
Fuzzy logic and Bayesian networks based FTs have been commonly used
to incorporate the effects of randomness, uncertainly and operational con-
ditions in the reliability analysis of communication systems. Some targeted
areas of communication systems include communication control system [139],
Simple Networks Management Protocol (SNMP) [140], Global Positioning
System (GPS) [141], intelligent substation’s communication network [142]
and decentralized traction control system [143]. For instance, operational
conditions that change over time and lead to random and uncertain faults
have been captured by fuzzy logic based FTs [139] and thus the reliability
of corresponding communication control system (CCS) is analyzed and opti-
mized accordingly. Similarly, Bayesian networks have been used to simplify
a large FT model of the intelligent substation for analysis purposes [142].
Due to the inherent bidirectional reasoning technology, Bayesian networks
have also been used to identify the weak links in the model with the aim to
improve the reliability of the underlying communication network.
Beside communication networks, many interesting works have been found
that utilized analytical approaches to analyze dynamic fault trees [144, 145,
146, 147]. For instance, the authors present an algebraic framework to model
dynamic gates and than can be used to determine the structure function of
any Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) [144].
5.2. Simulation Tools based Analysis with Fault Tree
In many real-world communication networks, there are a large number
critical communication components, which makes the corresponding FT mod-
els quite complex and the corresponding paper and pencil based analysis
become almost impossible. Therefore, computer simulation tools, such as
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SHARPE [113], HARP [148] and OpenFTA [149], have been widely adopted
for the reliability analysis of communication networks. For instance, various
critical components of a WSN, which includes base station, sensors, power
supply, wireless channel, analog to digital converters (ADC), micro-controller
etc., have been modeled using a FT and the failure analysis of a WSN is car-
ried out using the SHARPE failure analysis tool [150]. Moreover, SHARPE
has also been used to analyze the effects of the network topology on the relia-
bility of the communication networks [26]. Similarly, Monte-Carlo simulation
and the OpenFTA tool have been used for the reliability analysis of Seamless
Aeronautical Networking through the integration of Data links Radios and
Antennas (SANDRA) demonstrator system and wide area protection system
(WAP) [151] [152]. Moreover, the HARP software has been frequently used
for the FT based reliability analysis of fault-tolerant mission avionic systems
(MAS) and fault-tolerant hypercube systems [148].
Besides the above-mentioned fault tree simulation tools, there are many
others that can provide many interesting and powerfull features to analyze
complex fault trees. Some of them include, MatCarloRE [153] that can
solve hierarchical DFT, RAATSS [154] developed using Matlab toolbox for
solving Repairable Dynamic Fault Tree, Mo¨bius [155], for general purposes
performability evaluation based on Stochastic Activity Networks, OMNet++
[156] provides a component architecture for models. Firstly, the components
or modules are programmed in C++, then assembled into larger components
and Perfecto/UA [157] gives a library for the performance evaluation in OPC
UA Communication based on OMNet++.
Many approaches have been proposed in order to reduce the computa-
tional efforts of simulation approaches [158, 159, 160, 161]. For instance, a
composition algorithm is used to generalize the traditional hierarchical tech-
nique that is able to reduce the computational effort of a large DFT [158].
Similarly, DFT reliability solvers are developed, based on the Monte Carlo
simulative approach, and are written using Matlab code [159, 160]. Approx-
imate Markov chain method for dynamic fault tree analysis is proposed for
both reparable and non-reparable systems that readily improve the analysis
capabilities [161].
5.3. Formal Models with Fault Tree
The COMPASS tool [162], developed at the RWTH Aachen University
in collaboration with the European Space Agency (ESA), supports the for-
mal FT analysis, specifically for aerospace systems. For verification purposes,
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COMPASS provides support of several model checking tools, like the NuSMV
[163] and MRMC [164] model checkers. This tool provide various templates
containing placeholders that have to be filled in by the user. These templates
are primarily composed of the most frequently used patterns that allow easy
specifications of property by non-experts by hiding the details of the under-
lying temporal logic. The tool generates several outputs, such as traces, FTs
and FMEA tables, along with diagnostic and performance measures. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, the tool has not been used in the context
of verifying communication networks
Some efforts have been made to analyze the FT formally using theorem
proving techniques. For example, the Interval Temporal Logic (ITS), i.e., a
temporal logic which is a combination of first order and propositional logic,
based FT tree analysis is presented in [165, 166]. The work in [165] provides
the formalization for a rail-road crossing case study and the logic gates of
FT are modeled using propositional and temporal logic and the verification
of the overall FT is carried out by using the Karlsruhe Interactive Verifier
(KIV) [167] system. Although, the analysis is formal but the fault tree
construction is intuitive. Similarly, the work presented in [168], proposes
to first construct the FT formally by using the Observational Transition
Systems (OTS) [169] and then conduct the formal analysis by using CafeOBJ
[170, 170], which is a formal specification language that verifies software and
hardware systems interactively. Moreover, a higher-order-logic formalization
of FT gates has been recently proposed in [171, 172, 122], which allows
conducting the FT analysis within the sound core of a higher-order-logic
theorem prover. However, none of the above-mentioned works have been used
to conduct the formal dependability analysis in the domain of communication
networks.
The dynamic behavior of networks components, such as timed behavioral
nature, cannot be captured by simple FT models but Petri Nets provide
a very feasible alternative for this purpose. The communication network
under consideration is modeled with a FT, which is then transformed into
its corresponding Petri Nets based model for analysis. For example, the
reliability of the broadband integrated service network (B-ISDN) has been
assessed by modeling the dynamic re-routing mechanism of the traffic by
using the FT-based Petri Net approach [173].
A summary of reliability works using FT-based modeling is presented in
Table 5.
36
Table 5: Representative summary of Fault Tree reliability assessments using
various Analytical/Simulation/Formal Methods analysis techniques
Network
Characteristic
Ref. Brief summary
Failure Prone
Hardware/
Software Compo-
nents
[136] A longitudinal control system of the auto-
mated highway system is modeled and thus
its failure probability is calculated
[137] A transmission line protection system is ana-
lyzed in this paper
[138] A communication topology of LAN, named
FDDI token ring, is modeled and analyzed in
this paper
Dynamic Behavior [139] Due to the randomness and fuzziness of CCS
system, its behavior is captured by fuzzy fault
tree for reliability analysis
[140] An SNMP protocol based DCN system, pos-
sessing fuzziness is modeled and analyzed in
this paper
[141] A system is first modeled through FT and
then FT model is transformed into fuzzy fault
tree to capture fuzziness of the system
[142] A star topology based DCN of intelligent sub-
station is modeled and analyzed
[143] A decentralized traction control system of the
communication network is modeled
[173] A B-ISDN network deployed in a power plant,
is modeled and analyzed using Petri Net ap-
proach
Dependent Fail-
ures/
Topologies/
Components Ef-
fects
[150,
26]
The wireless sensors connected with each oth-
ers through different communication topolo-
gies, and a cluster based WSN are modeled
and analyzed using SHARPE simulation tool
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[152] The communication layers such as, regional
communication, substation communication
and wide area communication of the commu-
nication system of WAP are modeled and an-
alyzed using OpenFTA
[151] A SANDRA demonstrator system of the
avionics system is analyzed using OpenFTA
Fault Tolerance [148] A fault tolerant MAS system, with redun-
dancy approach and recovery approach is
modeled and analyzed using HARP
6. Reliability Analysis of Communication Networks with Markov
Chains
Markov chains (MCs) offer a state-based mathematical modeling tech-
nique, which has been extensively utilized to capture the dynamic and prob-
abilistic behavior of communication networks. The analysis start by con-
structing a state based model of a given network system, known as a Marko-
vian model, which is then analyzed either analytically, or using simulation or
formal methods based techniques. Reliability analysis using MC is amongst
the most commonly used approaches and have been used in various commu-
nication domains, including client server networks, ad-hoc networks, WSNs,
high-speed train networks and network storage systems. In this section, we
present a comprehensive survey of these contributions, while classifying them
according to the underlying analysis techniques like in the previous two sec-
tions.
6.1. Analytical Methods with Markov Chain Based Analysis
Due to rapidly increasing usage of communication services in our daily
life, the problems related to data communication is also becoming dynamic
and adverse, which consequently affects the wireless channel unavailability,
transmission line failure and latency delays in data transmission. To design a
network that can mitigate these affects, the reliability analysis of the network
is indispensable. It has been found that MC is the most widely used reliability
modeling technique to incorporate the dynamic behavior of the data trans-
mission system in a communication network for reliability analysis. Some of
the major domains of communication networks that utilize MC for reliability
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analysis include wireless ad-hoc networks [174] [175] [176], communication
machine 2 (CM-2) [177], multi-hop linear networks [178], high speed trains
[179] [180], multi-server client server systems [181], mobile cloud comput-
ing systems [182] [183] [184], cloud storage systems [185], cellular networks
[186] [187], wide area measurement (WAM) systems [188], cognitive radios
networks [189] and emergency communication systems [190]. Considering a
vehicular ad-hoc network [174], which is considered to be unreliable due to
lack of acknowledgment of the broadcasted messages by the receiving vehi-
cles, the varying number of broadcasted messages are modeled with a 2D
MC to present the dynamic message transmission process of the VANETs.
The MC is then analyzed to evaluate the reliability of the communication
network in terms of messages transmission delays.
Table 6: Representative summary of Markov-based reliability assessments
using various Analytical/Simulation analysis techniques
Network
Characteristic
Ref. Brief summary
Data Communica-
tion System
[174] The performance in terms of transmission de-
lay is evaluated for safety message broadcast
system through Markov Chain
[175] The performance in terms of wireless commu-
nication is evaluated for drive through internet
system through Markov Chain
[176] A Markov chain based quantitative approach
has been proposed for the reliability analysis
of WSNs
[177] The performance in terms of message delay
is evaluated for the communication machine 2
(CM-2) through DTMC modeling
[178] The reliability of multi hop linear network is
analyzed using quasi stationary Markov Chain
[179] The reliability of wireless data transmission
system of high speed rail system is analyzed
using Markov Chain
[180] The reliability of high speed train is analyzed
using Markov Chain
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[181] The reliability of multi server client system is
analyzed using Markov Chain
[182] A strategy is proposed of improving the re-
liability of mobile computing system using
Markov Chain. the proposed strategy encoun-
ters mobiles volatility
[183] A framework is proposed to improve the ser-
vice selection system of the cloud computing
system and its performance is analyzed using
Markov Chain
[184] The performance in terms of latency delay is
analyzed of the cloudlet based centralized ar-
chitecture for mobile cloud computing system
using CTMC
[185] A Markov Chain based reliability analysis
framework is presented to improve the repli-
cation techniques in cloud storage system
[186] The survivability in terms of call blocking and
excess delay due to failure is analyzed for cel-
lular networks using Markov Chain
[187] A novel approach has been proposed for reduc-
ing cost and improving availability of 4G-LTE
mobile networks using Markov Chain
[188] A Markov Chain based reliability analysis of
wide area measurement (WAM) system is pre-
sented
[190] The reliability analysis of emergency commu-
nication system is performed using Markov
Chain
[189] Availability analysis of the wireless channel of
cognitive network radios (CNR) is performed
using CTMC
Fault Tolerance [191] A Markov Chain based reliability and avail-
ability of the trusted two link protocols of the
WSNs is performed
[192] The reliability of fault tolerant WSN is ana-
lyzed using Markov Chain
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[193] A fault tolerant network storage system is pre-
sented and some redundancy mechanisms are
proposed. Each redundancy mechanism of the
system is analyzed and compared in terms of
reliability
[194] The reliability and availability analysis of gi-
gabit Ethernet network control system is per-
formed using CTMC
[195] The reliability in terms of synchronous trans-
mission is analyzed for multi-hop system using
Markov Chain
[196] A Markov Chain based reliability analysis of
a power communication system such as spider
web, is presented
Channel Charac-
teristics
[197] The reliability in terms of wireless channel
communication and link quality is analyzed
for WSN using Markov Chain
[198] The reliability of global system for mobile
communication rail (GSM-R) is analyzed us-
ing Markov Chain
[199] The reliability of copper and fiber based ar-
chitecture of railway communication system is
analyzed using Markov Chain
[200] The reliability analysis of randomized pulse
modulation scheme of a security communica-
tion system has been presented
Dependant Fail-
ures
[201] The reliability and availability in terms of ser-
vice faults and physical breakdown is analyzed
for cloud computer service using a Markov
Chain and as well as MTTR/MTTF formu-
las
[202] The availability analysis of Eucalyptus cloud
computing is presented
[203] A wireless network system such as, wireless
CORBA system with imperfect network com-
ponents, is analyzed to calculate end-to-end
instantaneous reliability
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[204] A Markov Chain computationally inexpensive
approach has been presented for the reliabil-
ity analysis of cloud services with dependent
failures
Table 7: Representative summary of Markov-based reliability assessments
using various Formal Methods
Network
Characteristic
Ref. Brief summary
Behavioral Net-
works/ Uncertain-
ties
[205] A Markov Chain based reliability analysis ap-
proach is presented for MINs. The approach
first tends to evaluate MINs at component
level and finally at system level
[206]
[207]
The reliability and availability of IP multi me-
dia subsystem is analyzed using Markov Chain
[206]
[207]
The reliability and availability of IP multi me-
dia subsystem is analyzed using Markov Chain
[41] The availability of mobile cloud computing
system is analyzed by modeling the physical
components using CTMC
[98] A Markov Chain based approach is presented
to analyze the reliability of smart grid station
having dependent failures
[208] An MS-exchange email server having uncer-
tain failure rates and repair rates is modeled
and analyzed
[202] The availability analysis of Eucalyptus cloud
computing is presented
[41] The availability of mobile cloud computing
system is analyzed by modeling the physical
components using CTMC
Data Communica-
tion Networks/
Concurrent
Failutes
[114] The survivability analysis of VADHOC net-
work, in terms of message lost, is modeled us-
ing Markov reward modeling and analysis is
done using SHARPE software
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[209] A reliable WSN system is presented for safety
applications and its reliability analysis is done
using Markov Chain and analysis is done in
SHARPE software
[116] The reliability analysis of VoIP network is per-
formed by simulating its RBD model using
RAPTOR tool
[210] The reliability and availability analysis of
nanosatellites based spacecrafts-swarm is per-
formed using Markov Chain and analysis is
done through Monte Carlo simulation
Data Communica-
tion Network/
Network Protocols
[211] The reliability and rapidness analysis of fast
and secure protocol, in term of successful de-
livery and time elapsed, is performed using
Markov Chain and analysis is done in PRISM
model checker
[212] The survivability analysis of WSN, in terms
of data loss and frequency of failures, is per-
formed using PRISM model checker
[213] The dependability properties of wireless group
communication are verifies using ETMCCC
model checker
Data Communica-
tion System/
Unreliable Compo-
nents
[214] A finite retrial system with unreliable and
multi servers, is analyzed through Petri Nets
[199] WLAN based data communication systems
are presented for CTBC and are analyzed
through Petri Nets
[186] The survivability analysis of cellular network,
in terms of excess delay due to failure and call
blocking, is performed using Petri Nets
[215]
[216]
Erlang-B and Erlang-C traffic scenarios are
created and thus reliability is evaluated
[217] WSNs are modeled and analyzed through SPN
to observe the effects of data packet number,
throughput and arrival rate
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[218] A timed rotation token protocol is analyzed
for the reliability analysis of FDDI using Petri
Nets
[219] Two types of networks architectures are mod-
eled for a file server system and are analyzed
using Petri Nets
[220] The reliability analysis of a finance service net-
work is performed using Petri Nets
[221] The reliability analysis of a system with three
computers and distributed memory is per-
formed using Petri Nets
[222] A system with one user and two users is ana-
lyzed using Petri Nets
Due to the ability of a MC to incorporate components redundancy, it
has been used to evaluate the reliability of the networks that are comprised
of redundant components, like wireless ad-hoc networks [191], WSNs [192],
network storage systems [193] and gigabyte Ethernet systems [194]. For in-
stance, in a wireless ad-hoc network whose functionality is defined by the
Trust Levels Routing Protocol (TLR), the wireless transmission nodes of the
network are redundant [191]. The behavior of these redundant nodes is mod-
eled and analyzed with a finite state CTMC for the reliability analysis of the
ad-hoc network. Moreover, MCs have also been used to analyze the relia-
bility of energy efficient communications networks, which include low power
wireless multi-hop networks [195] and power line communication networks
[196]. For instance in a low-power multi-hop network, the functionality of
the Synchronous Protocol (ST), which greatly reduces the overall network en-
ergy consumption and simplifies the mathematical modeling of the network,
has been modeled and analyzed by MCs [195].
Mobility of the network components considerably affects the reliability
and availability of any communication network as the behavior of the net-
work becomes dynamic due to the changing position of the network compo-
nents. Due to the dynamic characteristic of MCs, they have been widely used
to capture the effect of component’s mobility on the overall reliability and
availability of the communication networks. Some of the reliability analysis
work in this context includes industrial WSNs [197], high speed train com-
munication networks [198] [199], and randomized pulse modulation (RPM)
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[200]. Consider the example of industrial WSNs, where the dynamic behavior
of the sensors, which is mainly due to their mobility and harsh environment
in an industrial area, has been modeled with a finite-state MC. This MC is
then solved to evaluate the end-to-end communication reliability of the WSN
[197]. Besides mobility, the effect of network components failures on the over-
all network’s reliability and availability have also been widely observed by
modeling the communication network with MCs, where the components fail-
ures are defined by some unique Markov states. For instance, the effect of
service failures and resource breakdowns on the reliability of cloud comput-
ing network has been observed using MCs in [201] [202]. Some other relevant
works in this regard include the reliability analysis of cloud services [204] and
wireless network CORBA [203].
The size of the MC significantly increases with the increase in the size of
the communication network. For large communication networks, MC-based
reliability analysis become challenging due to the exponential increase in the
number of states. A hybrid approach, i.e., a combination of RBD and MC,
has been used to cater this issue and thus conduct the reliability analysis of
large communication networks, such as mobile cloud computing system [41],
cloud computing system [202], MINs [205], IP multimedia subsystems [206]
[207] and power grid communication systems [98]. For a particular commu-
nication network, the components that possess timed behavioral nature are
modeled with MCs whereas the other components are modeled with RBDs.
For example, the components of the cloud computing, including Wi-Fi, bat-
tery and resource mobility, have been modeled with RBD whereas the MC
has been developed to capture the timed behavioral nature of the network in
[41]. Moreover, communication networks with uncertain workload parame-
ters, imprecision, and imperfect coverage have been analyzed with fuzzy logic
based MCs [208]. The network is modeled with MC to present the proba-
bilistic behavior and the model is enhanced with fuzzy logic to deal with the
uncertainties. For instance, both MC and fuzzy logic have been utilized to
conduct the reliability analysis of disk arrays, which are used to store the
data of MSExchange like email servers in [208].
6.2. Simulation Tools based Analysis with Markov Chain
As described above, the MC becomes quite large for communication net-
works with complex behaviors and too many components. Considering the
example of fault tolerant WSNs, the total number of sensor nodes in a wire-
less cluster doubles when one extra spare sensor node is added with each
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sensor node [209]. Due to the increase in the total number of sensor nodes,
the complexity of the network significantly increases and this yields to a sig-
nificantly larger MC. Specialized simulation tools for MC based reliability
analysis tackle these problems quite well. The SHARPE tool has been used
for the reliability analysis of VANETs [114] and fault tolerant WSNs [209].
Similarly, the RAPTOR tool has been used for the analysis of VoIP commu-
nication system [116] and Monte Carlo simulation based reliability analysis
of satellite swarms [210].
6.3. Formal Methods with Markov Chain
Model Checking [223] is one of the powerful formal methods that facili-
tates the user to describe the behavior of a given system in the form of a state
machine and verify the user-defined properties against it. It verifies the prop-
erties by checking each state rigorously and provide accurate results. Prob-
abilistic Model Checking technique extends the traditional model checking
principles for the analysis of MCs and allows the verification of probabilistic
properties. Some notable probabilistic model checking tools include PRISM
[224] and ETMCC [225]. Probabilistic Model Checking technique has been
considerably adopted to verify the reliability and availability properties of
many communication networks, such as Fast And Secure Protocol (FASP)
[211], WSNs [212] and wireless group communication [213]. Considering the
reliability analysis of FASP, the reliability of successful data transmission
is defined in Stochastic Temporal Logic (STL) whereas the communication
network is modeled in the form of a sender, receiver and a communication
channel module in PRISM. The reliability property is then verified against
the communication network using the PRISM model checker.
Recently, a higher-order-logic formalization of time-homogeneous DTMC
with finite state space has been presented using the HOL theorem prover
[226]. This foundational formalization has been used to verify some simple
case studies, including a simple binary communication channel.
A lot of work has been done on analyzing reliability of communication
networks using Petri Nets with Markov chains. The main idea is to first
model the system using MC and then transform it into its corresponding
Petri Net model, which is finally analyzed. Using this approach, the reliabil-
ity analysis of finite source retrial system that possesses unreliable hardware
and multi servers is presented in [214]. Some other prominent works in this
direction include the reliability analysis of the data communication systems
of the WLAN based train control system [199], cellular networks [186] and
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WSNs [215] [216] [217]. Moreover, some network protocols, like courier and
FDDI token ring protocol, have also been analyzed using the Petri Net ap-
proach [227] [218]. The effects of the network architecture on the reliability
of the whole system is presented for the file server system [219] , finance ser-
vice networks [220], distributed memory network [221] and Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) satellite network [222].
A summary of reliability works using MC modeling with analysis per-
formed through analytical/simulation and formal methods are presented in
Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
6.4. Network Metrics
RBD and FT have not been directly utilized for network metrics assess-
ment due to the fact that they are especially developed for reliability analysis.
On the other hand, MC is a flexible technique and has been used for ana-
lyzing a variety of network metrics for instance, downtime, throughput and
resilience. Some key works in this direction are listed in Table 8.
Table 8: Representative summary of Communication Networks Metrics As-
sessment Using Markov Chains
Network Metrics Ref. Description
Throughput [228] Markov chains have been used to analyze the
carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) type
MAC protocol for its delay and throughput
characteristics with and without transmitter
power control
[229] Analyzed the achievable region of the through-
put in a slotted ALOHA-based two-way relay
network by using Markov chains
[230] Analyzed the number of polls (NPS) in Wimax
networks based on the Markov chain analysis
for minimizing the average polling delay while
increasing network throughput
Latency [231] Using Markov chains, the authors investigate
the effect of finite buffer sizes on the through-
put capacity and latency in terms of packet
delay of line network with packet erasure links
that have perfect feedback
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[232] A Markov chain method has been proposed
in order to estimate the throughput and aver-
age latency in wireless erasure networks with
nodes having finite buffers
Resilience [233] Reliability Assessment of resilient packet ring
(RPR) is carried out using Markov chains
[234] Error resilience parameters are proposed for
Mobile AdHoc Network (MANET) network
scenarios as an appropriate error resilience
configuration, which are then analyzed using
Markov chains
[235] Using Markov chains, the authors systemati-
cally analyze the features of resilience to fail-
ures and attacks of the current structured P2P
systems in terms of average path length and
hit ratio and understand the causes, which
lead to better resilience features.
[236] The author discusses business impact analy-
sis in the context of resilient communication
networks. It is based on the total (aggre-
gated) penalty that may be paid by an oper-
ator when the services (identified with trans-
port demands) provided are interrupted due
to network failures. First a CTMC model is
constructed and then means and variances of
compensation policy-related penalty values for
all the services are found using Markov chains.
Producibility [27] A new dependability parameter is defined, re-
ferred to as producibility, which is able to cap-
ture the capability of a sensor to accomplish
its mission and is estimated by using Markov
chains.
7. Insights and Common Pitfalls
In this section, we endeavor to clarify the difference among the reliabil-
ity modeling techniques of Section 2 by comparing them and highlighting
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their advantages and limitations. The comparison among these modeling
techniques is shown in Table 10.
The criteria for the selection of these modeling techniques, for a certain
system, mainly depends upon the type of system and problem domain. For
instance, RBD is primarily used if we are interested in the successful working
of the system while the FT models the failure relationship due to the failure
of individual component of the system. Although, both of these techniques
work well for combinatorial type of problems but cannot handle the non-
combinatorial problems. On the other hand, Markov chain provides analysis
for a wide variety of problems but fails to cater for large and complex systems
due to exponential growth in the number of states.
An abstract overview of the trends of surveyed works in this paper is
presented, as shown in Figure 9. It has been observed that the major focus
in 1980s and 90s was on the development of primitive reliability modeling
techniques. Some of these modeling techniques had been utilized for the com-
munication network problems. However, in 2000-09, the major focus moved
to the amalgamation of different modeling techniques, development of new
simulation tools for reliability assessment and utilization of formal methods,
such as Petri Nets and model checking, in the domain of reliability analysis.
It has been noticed from the last five years that one of the active research
areas is the incorporation of capturing dynamic behaviors in RBDs and FTs
and their application to communication network problems. A significant de-
velopment has been also done in developing the foundational framework for
reliability assessment using HOL theorem proving [81, 171, 237] and it has
been successfully utilized for the reliability analysis of WSN data transport
protocols [238].
An histogram overview of network characteristics versus number of sur-
veyed paper with respect to reliability modeling techniques is shown in Figure
10. The number of papers for MC is much more for analyzing dynamic be-
haviours compared to RBD and FT.
Although, MC is the most utilized reliability modeling technique for net-
work problems but we can notice from Table 9 that few researchers utilized
MC in the area of network topologies and network protocols. On the other
hand, FTs and RBDs have been extensively utilized for fault tolerance and
software/hardware failures related network reliability problems. But, not
much work has been done using these techniques for modeling and analyzing
message delay and channel characteristics network problems. Similarly, sim-
ulation methods have been used for almost every network characteristic and
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 Reliability and 
Availability 
Concepts
 Fault Tree  and its 
extension with 
Fuzzy Logic
 Petri Nets 
 SHARPE tool
 Markov Chain 
application to MIN 
network
 Bayesian Network
 Fuzzy logic extension for 
reliability
 Galileo Tool 
 Model Checking
 Petri Nets for 
communication 
networks, FDDI network, 
file server and finance 
service system
 Fault Tree for 
transmission network, 
FDDI token ring
 HARP Tool for fault 
tolerant
 RBD for power system, 
fault-tolerant WSN, 
smart grids and electric 
power transmission 
system
 Dynamic RBD and DFT 
concept
 Mobius, Omnet++, 
COMPASS tool 
 Colored Petri Nets 
(CPN)
 Fuzzy FT for INS/GPS 
system
 Stochastic Activity 
Network for 
performance 
evaluation
 Model checking for 
wireless group 
communication
 SPN for survivabililty 
evaluation of 
distributed services
 Dynamic RBD and FT 
and their application 
to smart grids, 
vehicular network 
and virtualized 
network
 Probabilistic model 
checking for 
reliability analysis
 Markov chain for 
mobile cloud 
computing
 Probabilistic Analysis 
support in Higher-
order Logic (HOL) 
theorem Proving
 HOL based reliability 
analysis of soft-error 
in memory arrays 
and WSNs
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Figure 9: Timeline of the Surveyed Techniques
among formal methods, Petri Nets have been the most utilized method, es-
pecially for software/hardware related reliability analysis network problems.
Table 9: Representative summary of Reliability Modeling and Analysis Tech-
niques used for Communication Network Characteristics
N etwork Be-
haviour
FT RBD MC S imulation Formal
Methods
Fault Tolerance [148] [83,
84,
85,
86,
87,
88]
[191,
192,
193,
194,
195,
196]
[191, 192, 193,
194, 195, 196]
[128, 134]
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Network Protocols [140] [102,
103]
[211] [140] [238] [211]
Failure
Prone Hard-
ware/Software
Components
[136,
137,
138]
[114,
115,
116,
117]
[201] [136, 137, 138]
[201]
[125, 126, 127,
135, 130, 131]
Message Delay [186,
174,
184]
[186, 174, 184]
Channel Charac-
teristics
[114] [197,
198,
199,
200]
[197, 198, 199,
200] [114]
Network Topolo-
gies
[142,
138,
150,
26]
[105] [142, 138, 150,
26]
[238]
7.1. Comparison of Reliability Modeling Techniques
In this section, we will compare and contrast the various reliability mod-
eling techniques presented in this paper. In particular, we will provide a
discussion on the advantages and limitations of reliability modeling using
the techniques of RBDs, FTs, MC, and BNs, respectively. A tabulated sum-
mary of this comparison is presented in Table 10.
7.1.1. Advantages and Limitations of Reliability Block Diagrams
Some of the advantages of RBD-based reliability assessment are as follows
[239]:
• It provides an early assessment of the design concept by which changes
in the design can be readily and economically incorporated.
• An analyst can easily visualize the system design as compared to FTs.
Some of the limitations of this technique are as follows [239]:
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• Systems must be broken down into components, which requires signif-
icant amount of effort.
• System element reliability estimates might not be readily available for
all elements.
• Not all systems can be modeled with combinations of series or parallel
branches.
7.1.2. Advantages and Limitations of Fault Trees
Some of the advantages of FT based reliability evaluation are as follows [239]:
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• Enables assessment of probabilities of combined faults/failures within
a complex system.
• Single-point and common cause of failures can be identified and as-
sessed.
• System vulnerabilities and low-payoff countermeasures are identified,
which facilitates the deployment of resources for improved control of
risks.
• Path sets can be used in trade studies to compare reduced failure prob-
abilities with increases in cost to implement countermeasures.
Some of the limitations of this technique are as follows [239]:
• Allow addressing only one undesirable condition or event in one FT
and thus usually require analyzing many FTs for the complete analysis
of a particular system.
• FTs used for reliability assessment of large systems may not fit or run on
conventional PC-based software. As the system increases in size and
complexity, the corresponding FT also increases in size and requires
more computational power [240, 241] for the generation of an accurate
reliability assessment of the given system.
• A FT does not guarantee an accurate analysis unless all significant
contributors of faults or failures are rightly anticipated.
7.1.3. Advantages and Limitations of Markov Chains
The advantages of using MC for analyzing reliability are as follows [239]:
• Provide a simple modeling approach for stochastic systems and an easy
computation of the probability of an event resulting from the sequence
of sub-events.
• System reconfiguration required by failures is easily incorporated in the
model due to its simple modeling approach.
• Covered and uncovered failures of the components are usually mutu-
ally exclusive events and thus they cannot be easily modeled by using
other techniques, such as RBD and FT, but are readily modeled by
Markovian models.
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Some limitation of Markov modeling are as follows [242]:
• Number of states increase exponentially as the size of the system in-
creases. Markov state diagrams for such large systems are generally
very complex and require computationally extensive manipulation us-
ing computer-based tools.
• Can only handle constant failure and repair rates, which limits its ap-
plicability for many real-world applications.
• Due to the memoryless property, the repair from a certain state may
return the system to a new condition [242].
7.1.4. Advantages and Limitations of Bayesian Networks
Some advantages utilizing BN modeling for reliability analysis are as follows:
• The graphical nature of a BN clearly displays the links between different
system components, which allows better understanding of the system-
component relationship and the effect of failure of components on the
overall system.
• One obvious advantage of the BN over other reliability modeling tech-
niques is that it uses prior information in order to estimate the relia-
bility of new systems when very limited data about them is available.
Some disadvantages of using BN modeling for reliability analysis are as fol-
lows:
• Sometimes prior information may not be accurate and thus leads to
misleading conclusions.
• Just like Markov chains, this technique is unable to handle large and
complex systems due to its state-based nature.
• It is often difficult to obtain the prior information of the system and
calculate conditional probabilities by using prior data.
Based on the survey conducted in Section 3, we have found that the
Markov Chain has been the most commonly utilized reliability modeling
technique for communication networks. Moreover, the MC-based reliability
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Table 10: Comparison of Reliability Modeling Techniques
Features Reliability
Block Diagram
Fault Tree Markov
Chain
Bayesian
Network
Success Domain X X X
Failure Domain X X X
Top Down Approach X X X X
Identification and Prevention of Faults X X X X
Combinatorial Problems X X X X
Non-combinatorial Problems X X
Large and Complex Systems X X
models of the systems are frequently analyzed by all three analysis tech-
niques, i.e., analytical, simulation and formal methods. On the other hand,
utilization of RBD and FT models for the reliability analysis of communi-
cation networks is rapidly increasing specifically by using simulation tools.
Other techniques, such as fuzzy logic and BN, have been also significantly
contributing in the reliability analysis of communication networks domains
in situations where the MC, RBD and FT have some limitations. The usage
of formal methods based analysis of MC models of communication networks
has also found some interest recently. On the other hand, to the best of
our knowledge, the usage of FT and RBD models for the formal reliabil-
ity analysis of communication networks is almost unexplored. We believe
that this combination of modeling and analysis technique has a huge poten-
tial for ensuring accurate reliability analysis of safety-critical communication
networks.
7.2. Common Pitfalls of Reliability Modeling Techniques
There are many challenges involved in evaluating and defining reliability
for communication networks [4, 16]. These challenges include (i) defining
reliability adequately, (ii) the determination of possible states of the network,
and (iii) the impact of failures on reliability for large number of network
elements in the presence of multi-layer protection techniques.
RBD and FT can only be utilized when the communication network can
be easily partitioned into logical blocks, such as multistage interconnection
networks (MINs) [85], and a rooted fault tree can be constructed based on the
logical relationship of the network components failure, such as substation’s
communication network [142], respectively. Also, both these techniques have
shown limitations when the behavior of the network is dynamic, i.e., the state
of the system is changing with respect to time [202, 205].
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On the other hand, MC can capture the dynamic behaviour of the many
complex communication networks, such as randomized pulse modulation
(RPM) [200], and also overcome the limitations of RBD and FT by providing
an extension to these techniques, such as DRDB and DFT. However, MC can
only be applicable to those kinds of communication networks which can be
modeled in the form of states and requires significant amount of memory and
computational power to analyze large communication network systems [242].
All three modeling techniques, i.e., RBD, FT and MC, require a statistical
estimate of reliability of the sub-components of the network in order to eval-
uate the reliability of overall network system and are not applicable when
the sub-component reliability related data is not available. This limitation in
reliability estimation of communication networks has been handled by using
the fuzzy logic technique, such as in single node WSN [110] and commu-
nication control systems (CCS) [139]. BN utilizes the prior information to
evaluate the communication network system reliability [109, 142]. Thus, all
these techniques are somewhat complementary in nature and have to used
in the right context to evaluate the reliability of the given communication
network.
7.3. Comparison of Reliability Analysis Techniques
In this section, we will compare and contrast the various techniques avail-
able for analyzing reliability models. In particular, we will provide a discus-
sion on the advantages and limitations of analytical, simulation, and formal-
methods based reliability analysis techniques. A tabulated summary of this
comparison is presented in Table 11.
7.3.1. Advantages and Limitations of Analytical Techniques
Paper-and-pencil based analytical analysis is undoubtedly the most com-
monly used analysis technique for the reliability analysis of systems. The
usage of mathematical modeling and reasoning ascertains accurate results.
However, the involvement of manual manipulation and simplification, makes
the analysis error-prone and the problem gets more severe while analyzing
large systems. Moreover, it is possible—in fact a common occurrence—that
many key assumptions required for the analytical proofs are in the mind of
the mathematician and are not documented. These missing assumptions are
thus not communicated to the design engineers and are ignored in the sys-
tem implementations, which may also lead to erroneous designs. Moreover,
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paper-and-proof methods cannot be used to analyze the reliability of systems
that have large models due to the manual nature of this analysis technique.
7.3.2. Advantages and Limitations of Simulation Techniques
The main strength of the simulation tools is their user friendly interface
and analysis methods. Moreover, simulation is quite scalable as large models
of systems can be easily manipulated via computers, which are very efficient
in terms of book keeping. These benefits are usually attained by paying
hefty licensing costs for the commercial tools and these tools usually require
enormous computational resources. However, they cannot ensure absolute
correctness as well due to the involvement of pseudo-random numbers and
numerical methods and the inherent sampling-based nature of simulation.
7.3.3. Advantages and Limitations of Formal Methods
Due to the mathematical nature of the models and the involvement of
mathematical and logical reasoning techniques in formal methods, the anal-
ysis results are guaranteed to be accurate and complete. However, these
benefits are attained at the cost of heavy computational requirements, in the
case of automatic theorem proving and model checking, and explicit proof
guidance requirements, in the case of interactive theorem proving.
A comparison of the above-mentioned reliability analysis techniques is
given in Table 11. These techniques are evaluated according to their ex-
pressiveness, accuracy and the possibility of the automation of the analysis.
Model checking and Petri Nets are not expressive enough to model and verify
all sorts of reliability properties due to their state-based nature. The accu-
racy of the paper-and-pencil based proofs is questionable because they are
prone to human errors. Simulation is inaccurate due to the involvement of
pseudo-random number generators and computer arithmetics along with its
inherent sampling-based nature. Theorem proving does not support all the
reliability analysis foundations as of now. Finally, the paper-and-pencil based
proof methods and interactive theorem proving based analysis involve human
guidance and therefore are not categorized as automatic. However, there is
some automatic verification support (e.g. [71]) available for theorem proving,
which can ease the human interaction in proofs and thus we cannot consider
interactive theorem proving as a completely manual approach. These days
networking systems are extensively being used in many safety and financial
critical applications, such as medicine, transportation and banking. Thus,
the accuracy of their reliability analysis has become a dire need. As seen in
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Table 11: Comparison of Reliability Analysis Techniques
Feature Paper-and-
pencil Proof
Simulation
Tools
Petri
Nets
Theorem
Proving
Model
Checking
Expressiveness X X X
Accuracy X X X X
Automation X X X
Table 11, only model checking, Petri Nets and theorem proving can fulfill
these requirements, which makes formal methods a very interesting analysis
technique for the analysis of safety-critical systems.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a tutorial introduction to the modeling
and analysis techniques that have been used for studying reliability and avail-
ability of communication networks. We have discussed the various reliability
models constructed using the building blocks offered by the formalisms of
reliability block diagram, fault trees, Markov chains, and Bayesian network
models. We have also presented background, and a critical comparison, of
the various reliability analysis techniques (such as analytical methods, simu-
lation modeling, and formal methods). Apart from providing the necessary
background, we have also provided a detailed survey of the application of
these techniques in the existing literature focused on studying reliability of
communication networks. The main contribution of this work is that it is
the first work that has presented a comprehensive review of the various tech-
niques available for reliability modeling and analysis of communication net-
works along with a critical analysis describing their pros and cons in various
contexts.
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